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Originally designed as self-contained and isolated networks, Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have evolved to
become increasingly interconnected with IT systems and other wider networks and services, which enables
cyber attacks to sabotage the normal operation of ICS. This paper proposes a simulation of attackers and
defenders, who have limited resources that must be applied to either advancing the technology they have
available to them or attempting to attack (defend) the system. The objective is to identify the appropriate
deployment of specific defensive strategy, such as Defense-in-depth and Critical Component Defense.
The problem is represented as a strategic competitive optimisation problem, which is solved using a co-
evolutionary Particle Swarm Optimisation problem. Through the development of optimal defense strategies,
it is possible to identify when each specific defensive strategies is most appropriate; where the optimal
defensive strategy depends on the kind of attacker the system is expecting and the structure of the network.
Industrial Control Systems, Defense-in-depth, Defensive Strategy, Agent-based Modelling
1. INTRODUCTION
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) play a crucial role
in supervising industrial processes and production.
Disruption to ICS might lead to disastrous damage
to the plant, environment and even human health
(Stouffer et al. 2011). ICS were originally designed
as isolated self-contained systems, which nowadays
have evolved to become increasingly interconnected
with IT systems and other complex networks.
It greatly improves the efficiency of communication
and control of ICS, but has left ICS exposed to cyber
threats. Modern ICS thus have to be tolerant of
accidental malfunctions, as well as intentional cyber
attacks. ICS-CERT received 295 reports in 2015
by trusted asset owners1. In particular multi-stage
Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) account for
roughly 55% amongst the various cyber attacks
against ICS 2. ICS-targeted APT often start with
gaining access to the target network, propagate
through the network by continuously exploiting
chains of vulnerabilities, and eventually disrupt the
operation of ICS. We outline common ways to stage
APT targeting a typical ICS in Figure 1. The most
1ICS-CERT: Nov.2015 - Dec. 2015. https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/
monitors/ICS-MM201512
2ICS-CERT: Sep. 2014 - Feb. 2015. www.ics-cert.us-cert.gov/
monitors/ICS-MM201502
Figure 1: Typical ICS architecture threatened by APT
well-known example of such attacks is Stuxnet
in 2010 (Falliere et al. 2011), which was
introduced to the targeted network by a removable
flash drive and eventually infected approximately
100,000 hosts across over 155 countries until
September 2010 according to the Symantec
report by Falliere et al. (2011). More recent
accidents are the German steel mill breach in
December 20143 and the Ukrainian power outages
in December 20154.
3SANS ICS Case, 2014. https://ics.sans.org/media/ICS-CPPE-
case-Study-2-German-Steelworks Facility.pdf
4ICS-CERT Alert, 2016. https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/IR-
ALERT-H-16-056-01
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To mitigate the increasing cyber threats targeting
ICS, many government advisory reports and in-
dustrial standards propose Defense-in-Depth as the
best practice to defend ICS (Stouffer et al. 2011;
Kuipers and Fabro 2006). Defense-in-depth aims to
protect a system by establishing a multi-layer de-
fense by combining various defensive controls, such
as advanced firewalls with DMZ, security awareness
training programs, a vulnerability management sys-
tem, intrusion detection with effective access poli-
cies, and incident response mechanisms. However,
as there are numerous controls involved, it needs a
deployment plan to optimally distribute the defensive
resources over those controls before such practice
could produce the most effective protection with
limited resources. Otherwise the high financial and
managerial cost make defense-in-depth impractical
to fully implement (Small 2011), because massive
unnecessary efforts might be wasted on irrelevant
attack vectors and security activities. With limited
resources, system wide defense-in-depth provides
only a wide but low-level defense across the network,
which might be able to stop sophisticated attackers.
Therefore, we produce a decision support tool to
help with better understanding of defense for ICS,
and discover the optimal defensive strategy for use
in ICS.
The concept of attacker denotes the possible cyber
attackers attemping to breach an ICS, while defender
acts as the security manager who needs to deploy
available defensive controls to protect the ICS.
Given an established network, we first generate the
underlying attack graph for it by using our logic-
based reasoning engine. The attack graph chains
various weaknesses of the network that can be
exploited by attackers to stage an APT attack. The
attacker and defender are then modelled as a pair
of competing agents in a co-evolutionary simulation.
Particle Swarm Optimisation (PSO) (Kennedy 2010)
is adopted to aid agents in finding the most
optimal strategy to attack and defend given different
conditions and profiles. Agents’ gains and losses
are qualified in iterated games, by which an overall
score can be produced to evaluate the performance
of the chosen strategy. Eventually both the attacker
and defender would co-evolve to their best strategies
against each other. From this work, we discover
that the decision on defensive strategies should
rely on the type of attacks we are combating and
the network layout including network topology and
distribution of valuable targets. Particularly we find
out that system wide defense-in-depth is viable
in protecting the system from greedy attackers,
where lower-level conventional attacks are generally
used. However, defense-in-depth is less capable
of defending against more sophisticated attacks, in
which case the defensive effort should be focused
on the critical targets in the system. Furthermore,
we run extended experiments to investigate the role
of network topology in deciding defensive strategies.
Specifically we look at the performance of defending
bottleneck nodes of a network to produce effective
protection with minimised defensive efforts.
The paper starts with a related work section where
the work on attack modelling of ICS and APT at-
tacks, agent-based coevolutionary approaches and
PSO-related topics are presented. The approach
proposed in this paper is discussed in Section 3.1,
including the modelling of the key elements (e.g.
attacker methods, defense controls, network archi-
tecture) and the development of the agent-based
simulation. A case study extracted from CSSP Rec-
ommended Defense-In-Depth Architecture (Kuipers
and Fabro 2006) is designed in Section 4 to demon-
strate the effectiveness of our proposed tools in
finding optimal defense deployment. Five different
scenarios are provided to capture attackers and
defenders with different profiles. Relevant results are
presented in Section 5 and discussed in Section 6.
The paper concludes with a summary and discus-
sion of further directions of research in Section 7.
2. RELATED WORK
Stouffer et al. (2011) provided a comprehensive
introduction to the key ICS-specific cyber threats.
Automatic generation of attack graphs based on
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
vulnerabilities has been well developed, such as
the tool MulVal by Ou et al. (2006) and NetSPA
by Lippmann et al. (2005). However, such complete
CVE-based attack graphs are often very complex to
understand and analyse. Thus our work produced
attack graphs based on common weaknesses of
ICS, rather than specific vulnerabilities on each
host, by which we can lift our focus of defense
to combat generic classes of attacks and hence
produce a broader view to deploy defensive controls.
Lippmann et al. (2005) also abstracted complete
attack graphs by classifying vulnerabilities in terms
of CVE factors. Attack graphs have been applied
effectively to assess the potential risks of a
network. Noel et al. (2010) introduced a metric
for quantifying the security of a network based on
attack graphs with assigned likelihoods of each
attack edge. Using attack graphs for risk analysis
of critical infrastructures was reported by Ma and
Smith (2013). Attack graphs are able to help with
finding effective defensive measures by studying
the network structure and required vulnerabilities
to comprise a system. Thus we also adopt attack
graphs for the initial representation of the problem.
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Another closely related area to this work is
the concept of network hardening. Fielder et al.
(2014) present a game theoretic approach to the
optimal allocation of system administrator time
to defensive tasks. One important finding of the
work shows that a greater emphasis of the
limited administrator time should be placed on
the most valuable assets, which is conceptually
consistent with the Critical Component Defense
strategy discussed in this paper. Game theoretic
approaches using Stackelberg games to finding
optimal security decisions for real-world scenarios
have been extensively studied, such as scheduling
of airport security (Korzhyk et al. 2010), allocation
of air marshals to flight paths (Tsai et al. 2009) and
deployment of honeypots (Durkota et al. 2015).
PSO was originally proposed by Eberhart and
Kennedy (1995), and a more up-to-date review
of this area was provided by Poli et al. (2007).
Poli (2008) identified active applications of PSO,
and also pointed out that very little work has
undertaken by applying PSO to cyber security
problems, with only 1.3% of the literature covering
the whole security field, such as security predictions
(Gao et al. 2011), intrusion detection (Srinoy 2007)
and authentication (Karnan and Akila 2010).
A similar PSO-based simulation was also employed
to investigate the impact of cost-efficiency of defence
on deciding the optimal defence for ICS in our
previous work (Fielder et al. 2016) .
The elements of studying cyber security scenarios
are often represented in literature as adversarial
models, like those presented in the game theoretic
manner. However the strategy space available is
not as effective at representing the fluid nature of
APT attacks, which features an evolving strategy
space. The use of PSO for defining strategy aims to
overcome the problems of an evolving high variance
strategy space.
3. MODELLING AND SIMULATION
Figure 2 shows the schematic diagram of the
simulation. The Attacker Profile and Defender
Profile collect key elements to decide attackers
and defenders’ strategies and actions respectively.
Attackers’ strategies are decided by attack targets
(e.g. espionage or sabotage), resources available for
attackers and all possible attack paths. Particularly
the attack paths are generated by an automatic
reasoning engine by a logic programming technique
- Answer Set Programming (ASP) by
Gebser et al. (2011) analysing an established
network and exploits on each host in the network.
Defenders also have to decide the preference of
targets to defend, based on the available resource
Figure 2: system overview
and control pairs. Formal definitions of the above
notions above are given in Section 3.1. The
right part of Figure 2 depicts the development of
optimal solutions by using our simulation. Following
the optimization algorithm PSO, each candidate
strategy is encoded as a particle of a swarm and
all such particles are gradually moving towards the
best solution. In each iteration of evaluation, both
attackers and defenders generate the best response
to compete with each other, and eventually co-evolve
to optimal solutions. Details of the simulation and
optimisation process are discussed in Section 3.2.
3.1. Modelling and Representation
We start with the representation of the pair of
competing agents – Attackers and Defenders,
including the key components for defining their
strategies. We model a typical ICS architecture as
a network graph, where each host/asset is identified
as a target node ti ∈ T , an edge e ∈ E indicates
a valid connection between a pair of targets.
Each target has different impacts on attackers and
defenders. A compromised target produces certain
gains Ia : T → Z+ for attackers, while causing
certain damage for defenders Id : T → Z−.
The notion attack methods M = {m1, . . . ,mn}
collects all weaknesses of the targets in a network
and we mainly have three types of attack methods
in terms of their origins: (i) primary attacks: allow
attackers to gain initial access to the network,
such as Internet malware, social engineering, and
removable drives malware. (ii) subsequent attacks:
help attackers penetrate further into the network,
such as SQL-injection, weak authentication bypass
and other LAN-based infection. (iii) final attacks:
cause actual damage on the field devices, such as
buffer-overflow and man-in-the-middle attacks.
An attack path 〈(ti, tj),mk〉 is derived by attaching
an applicable attack method mk to an edge in the
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network, indicating a possible way to progress the
attack from one target ti to another tj . For this paper,
we develop a logic reasoning engine to generate
all possible attack paths for a given network, which
altogether render an attack graph. An example of
such an attack graph is given in the Fig3(a) of the
case study section. O(ti) has all outbound paths
from the target ti. At each step of an APT, attackers
decides either to upgrade an attack method, or to
perform an attack aganist a target. In the cases of
upgrading, attackers have to further select the attack
method to upgrade, while in the cases of actual
attacking, attackers have to decide which outbound
attack path to proceed.
Definition 1 An attack mixed strategy a :=
〈α, β,Φ,Ψ〉, where
• α ∈ [0, 1], probability of upgrading a method.
• β ∈ [0, 1], probability of launching attacks, and
α + β = 1.
• Φ = [φ1, . . . φn], probability distribution over M
and φk denotes the probability of upgrading the
attack method mk and
∑n
i=1 φi = 1, φi  0.
• Ψ = {ψ1, . . . ψm}, a set of probability distributions
over outbound paths from all targets, and ψi =
[ϕ1i , . . . , ϕ
k
i ] denotes the probability distribution
over all outbound paths from the target ti, denoted




i = 1, ϕ
j
i  0.
Upgrading attack methods is likely to increase the
chance of success, while only attacking brings actual
impacts. Both actions consume resources. A greedy
attacker spends most effort on performing attacks
rather than upgrading, but such attacks would not
succeed on heavily defended targets. A methodical
attacker tends to launch infrequent attacks with
more advanced attack methods. Finding an optimal
distribution between upgrading attack methods and
actual attacking is not an easy task, particularly
since the chosen attack strategy has to be evaluated
against unknown defender’s strategy.
The notion of defenders characterises the role of
a security manager who needs to find a way of
deploying defense controls to protect an ICS. We
define a set of defense controls C = {c1, . . . , cm},
that are available for an defender to employ and
D(ci) is the set of attack methods ci counters.
Defenders also have two actions to comprise a
defense strategy – advancing a defense control or
actually deploying a control. Unlike attackers who
have specific targets to plan attacks, defenders
have to protect a number of targets at different
levels of a network from numerous possible attacks.
Particularly, to combat APT-like attacks, defenders
are required to consider not only defending one
particular attack, but also stopping the exploit and
formation of a complete attack route reaching the
most valuable targets.
Definition 2 A defense mixed strategy d :=
〈γ, δ,Θ,Ω〉, where
• γ ∈ [0, 1], probability of advancing the defense
level of a control.
• δ ∈ [0, 1], probability of deploy a control, and
γ + δ = 1.
• Θ = [θ1, . . . θn], probability distribution over C. θi,
probability of advancing ci and
∑n
i=1 θi = 1, θi  0.
• Ω = [ω1, . . . ωm], probability distribution over
targets T and ωj is the probability of deploying
controls on target tj , and
∑m
j=1 ωj = 1, ωj  0.
Finding the most optimal defense strategy against
various unknown attack strategies is challenging.
Several well known defensive strategies are given
as follows: (i) system wide defense-in-depth (DID);
(ii) focusing the defense on the critical components
(CCD) in the network; (iii) defend the bottleneck
targets through which all attacks have to pass; or (iv)
mixture of the above. It is not easy to tell which one
is the most appropriate strategy combating various
types of attackers, and therefore we provide an
agent-based solution to this problem.
3.2. Simulation
We first model an attacker and a defender as a pair
of competing agents in a co-evolutionary process,
where both agents aim to produce the optimal
mixed strategies to maximise their payoffs. A PSO
algorithm is developed to solve such a problem.
It starts with an initial set of randomised mixed
strategies for the attacker and defender, represented
as particles in a swarm. The PSO then runs a
number of iterations in order to generate the best
response strategies to compete with each other. In
each run, the algorithm moves the particles towards
a better solution, which is achieved by applying
a movement parameter (called a velocity) to the
particles. The velocity of a particle is a special
form of the mixed strategy, where the sum of all
components must equal zero.
The evaluation of a particle is conducted by
simulating the interactions between the attacker and
the defender over a fixed number of time steps.
In terms of the damage that successful attacks
cause, the payoff of chosen actions at each step are
scored, by which an overall score can be produced to
evaluate their performance and the chosen strategy.
At each time step the defender chooses an action,
corresponding to advancing a control with probability
γ and deploys new defenses to a network component
with probability δ. If advance is selected, then the
defender increases the level of a control ci by
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Figure 3: Case study on ICS security management: (a) attack graph with all attack paths(dashed edges are removed
for Case 5); (b) attack methods from top weaknesses of ICS; (c) Common defense controls for ICS and attack methods
defended.
1 based on a single selection from amongst the
probabilities defined by Θ. If the defender chooses
to deploy a defense, then they select a device given
by the distribution and apply all available controls
for that device up to the maximal level advanced so
far. In a similar manner, the attacker advances the
methods which they are able to exploit the system
with probability α and attempt to attack the system
with probability β. When an attacker chooses to
attack, the attacker starts at the node labelled EXT
and selects a node to attack, and an associated
method to advance to that node. An attack can only
be considered successful if the level of the attack
is greater than the level of defense at that node,
the success of an attack is given by comparing the
level of the method of attack used and the highest
level of control implemented on that node. If an
attack is considered successful, then the attacker
selects a new node from that location and a new
method to attack, and the process is repeated until
either an attack is unsuccessful or, there are no
more outward paths from the current node. When
an attack is halted, the players each receive a
score associated with the last node that has been
successfully reached.
4. CASE STUDY
In this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness
of our tools with a case study on ICS security
management. The case study uses a typical three-
zone ICS architecture extracted from Kuipers and
Fabro (2006); Stouffer et al. (2011). As given
in Figure 3(a), there are three zones in the
architecture, Corporate Network, Control Network
and Field Devices. Each circle represents a
common type of host in each specific zone.
For instance, cpWs stands for a workstation in
the corporate network, and ctRWs for a remote
workstation in the control zone. EXT and PLC
are two special nodes, representing the external
untrusted environment and the key control units
respectively. Besides, a number of attack methods
are gathered in Figure 3(b) from ICS Top 10 Threats
and Countermeasures, BSI (2014) and Common
Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities in ICS, Department of
Homeland Security (2011). The corresponding set of
defense controls is given in Figure 3(c), derived from
BSI (2014) and Kuipers and Fabro (2006).
A complete attack graph in Figure 3(a) is then
generated by our ASP reasoning engine for the
case study. Each exploitation of a weakness of the
system is represented by an edge in the graph.
For instance, all attacks aiming to PLC have to
at least comprise either ctRWs or ctWs which has
direct access the PLC, and then launch attacks such
as Buffer Overflow (finM1) and Man-in-the-middle
(finM2). These control workstations are generally not
connected to any untrusted network, but they can be
infected by other hosts in the same control network
such as ctHmi and ctHist in the example. Besides,
remote workstations used by remote maintenance
contractors are threatened by viruses infected by
other external assets.
We design five scenarios for different analysis
purposes. Table 1 highlights the key settings
of the cases. Case 1 aims to find out the
optimal defense for protecting a single high-valued
target PLC, while Case 2 increases the values
of ctRWs and ctWs to create a larger defense
coverage to consider. Case 3(a) and 3(b) implement
paired strategies for both the attacker and the
defender, to investigate the interactions between
different strategies. Case 4 particularly studies
the the performance of defense-in-depth against a
methodical attacker. A complementary Case 5 is
designed to find out effective defensive strategies to
protect a network with bottleneck nodes.
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Table 1: Case study settings
Case 1 Single high-valued target (e.g. PLC)
Case 2 Multiple high-valued targets
Case 3(a) DID defender vs. Greedy attacker
Case 3(b) CCD defender vs. Methodical attacker
Case 4 DID defendervs. Methodical attacker
Case 5 Bottleneck-node Defense
The PSO algorithm sets the size of a swarm at
200, which was sufficient to represent and explore
the search space. The simulation operates over
100 moves per particle and for 100 generations of
competition between the two agents. The w values
for all factors contributing to the velocity were set
at 0.05, this was set so as to allow for better
exploration of the strategy space, by not favouring
a single component. It runs over 50 time steps for
the attacker and defender strategies and a particle is
evaluated 30 times to reduce variance from the non-
deterministic nature of the simulated environment.
5. RESULTS
The results of the simulations are represented as
combined effort heat maps of the network, shown
in Figure 4. The results represent the combined
effort that should be applied to the asset in the
network. For the defender, the combined effort is
the probability of upgrading the defense of a node,
added to the probabilities associated with advancing
the controls that are relevant to defending that node.
Additionally, the attackers effort is represented by
the lines connecting the node, where the combined
effort is the probability of using that attack path and
the probability of using and advancing the attack
methods relevant to that line. In Figure 4, the higher
the combined effort, the darker the colour of either
the line or node.
In this initial case 1, where we consider that each
player only has interest in the PLC, we see that in
Figure 4(a) that the defender chooses to apply a
large proportion of effort to the PLC Node.
The results present a case where the defender
chooses to split effort evenly between advancing and
upgrading, but chooses with p > 0.95 to advance
control c6 and applying that defense to the PLC
node. While the defender chooses to upgrade and
implement c6 in the results presented, c5 is equally
preferable in this scenario since it also protects PLC.
In addition to this, it is in the best interest of the
defender to upgrade only a single control and not
attempt to use both c5 and c6, since the effort would
be split between the two, but would not achieve
the same level of defense, since we consider the
defensive level to be equal to the highest of the
controls implemented.
Since the only damage in the system is represented
at the PLC node, this reduces the expected damage
to near zero levels. Since the damage reaches
a near zero level, the attacker has relatively few
strategic choices, with the primary method being
to be as aggressive as possible, with the aim
of exploiting the system before the defender has
established an effective defense.
As part of this, we see some incidental effort that is
applied to both cpServer and ctHist, this is because
control c6, has some protective capability for both
of those nodes, however the actual level of upgrade
applied to those nodes is very minimal.
Case 2 in Figure 4(b) represents a scenario, where
three nodes in the system are considered valuable
to both the attacker and the defender.
Unlike Case 1, the defender in this scenario chooses
to use control c5 instead of c6. The reason for this is
that in Case 1, there is no reason to try and defend
any other nodes, because the one valuable node is
fully protected, however with additional nodes that
are valuable there may be a justification for applying
defense elsewhere, which would warrant the use of
a control that is effective against the highest number
of additional vulnerabilities.
In this case slightly more emphasis has been placed
by the attacker on attacking ctWs over ctRWs, since
the former has a slightly higher value for the attacker
if it is compromised. While the defender does play
a defense-in-depth strategy, that would allow for the
attacker to attack ctWs with p = 1 to get a higher
score, the defender would be able to shift defensive
strategy to that node to reduce the damage even
further, as such it is in the best interest of the attacker
to spread the attack between ctWs and ctRWs.
Case 3 presents a scenario where there is value to
both players across the whole of the system. Unlike
in other cases, we see that there is no single strategy
that provides the best defense for the defender.
In this case we see that there are two possibilities
for both the attacker and the defender.
Figure 4(c) shows the first pair of strategies, which
represents a defense-in-depth and a greedy attacker.
The heat map displayed in Figure 4(c) shows a
low effort value on all of the nodes. The reason
for this apparently low effort, is that the defensive
actions are spread across all the nodes and controls.
This defensive strategy aims to provide a basic
defense on all of the nodes as quickly as possible
and then tries to slowly upgrade the whole defense
over time. This is a simple strategy that will prevent
most conventional attacks, but would not provide an
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Figure 4: Simulation Results
Table 2: Optimal Distribution in Strategies
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3a Case 3b
Defender Upgrade 0.47 0.47 0.77 0.47Advance 0.53 0.53 0.23 0.53
Attacker Attack 0.9 0.83 0.85 0.61Advance 0.1 0.17 0.15 0.39
effective mechanism against sophisticated attacks.
The attacker we see in Figure 4(c) is similar to the
attackers in both cases 1 and 2, which is considered
a greedy attacker, since it attacks frequently to
maximise score by launching lots of unsophisticated
attacks. In this case the attacker is able to potentially
score quickly as there are a number of nodes that
the attacker can exploit early.
Counter to this strategy, we have a defender
employing critical component defense and a more
methodical attacker in Figure 4(d). The methodical
attacker, still prefers to attack, since continually
advancing the attack methods does not impact
their score directly, however unlike the previously
seen greedy attackers, the methodical attacker
attempts to advance attack methods to be able to
reliably overcome low level defenses that might be
protecting the outer components of the system. This
is represented in in Figure 4(d) as a lower attack
effort across all lines.
The defender is the same critical component defense
style defender that we saw in case 2, where despite
the system having a number of nodes with value the
defender chooses to defend only the most important.
We have seen in Case 3a that this is not the only
possible choice for the defender and is relevant to
the attack strategy.
It is important to note, that both the defensive
strategies shown for case 3 in Figure 4 are the
counter to the paired attacker strategy. A greedy
attacker who is using low level attacks is countered
by a strategy that employs basic defenses across
the whole of the network, i.e. defense-in-depth.
However a methodical attacker will be able to beat
this strategy, since they advance the attack methods
over the basic controls that are present in the system
wide defenses, allowing them to more frequently
exploit the system to reach the high valued PLC
node. Against this methodical attacker, the defender
is best advised to play a critical component defense
strategy, since the attacker attacks less frequently,
so the average expected loss is reduced and the
PLC is not normally compromised. In this case the
attacker is more incentivised to launch numerous low
level attacks that are able to get past basic defenses,
which is akin to the initial greedy attacker.
Table 2 shows the distribution of optimal strategies
for each player amongst the two main actions. The
defender’s actions in Cases 1, 2 and 3b have the
same optimal probabilities, in which the defender
splits the effort in a near even manner between
advancing the level of the control and implementing
the upgrades. Likewise in Cases 1, 2 and 3a,
the attacker chooses to attack with probability
p(A) > 0.8. This represents the consistent behaviour
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Table 3: Distribution of Upgrade Effort by Node
Node cpWS cpEmail cpDatabase cpServer ctWS ctRW ctHmi ctHist Data
Case 3a 0.05 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.18 0.18 0.04 0.17 0.22
Case 3b 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.92
of an aggressive attacker and a critical component
defender. However if we consider the patient attacker
in case 3b, we see that they attack with a lower
probability, increasing the the likelihood that their
attacks are more sophisticated. The defender in
case 3a upgrades the defense more frequently than
the other defenders, where the defender advances
the controls rarely, opting to implement lower level
controls where available, this is consistent with a
defense-in-depth style approach.
Table 3 shows the distribution of emphasis on
upgrading the defense at each node in the network.
Case 3b shows that there is little emphasis placed
on any node other than data, with a value of 0.1 on
each node except for Data, which has a upgrade
probability of 0.92. This is in contrast to case 3a,
where Data only has an upgrade probability of 0.22.
The rest of the probability is then distributed amongst
the rest of the node. This is also reflected in the effort
place on controls, where in case 3b control c5 is
used with p(c5) = 0.97, but in case 3a the highest
distribution for any control is c3 with a p(c3) = 0.25.
6. DISCUSSION
The results present a scenario where we see
that there is a rationale to consider that critical
component defense is the most viable defensive
strategy given a limited amount of resources for
defending a system. This appears to hold true in
the case of industrial control systems with a single
asset or set of assets that are considered particularly
valuable compared to the rest of the system. With
a single point of failure, the defender is incentivised
to defend that node very heavily, even in the face
of other low value attacks. As the value of the
damage across the system rises, in comparison to
the node with a single point of failure, the defender
now has more incentive to protect more of the nodes
if possible. The results of case 3 identify that there is
a certain point where the value of the system causes
the defender to look at the trade-off between multiple
low level threats and single highly sophisticated
attacks. While the specific view of an ICS in this
paper focusses on those with highly valuable field
controllers, however not all ICS systems have these
single high value nodes; it is ICS with this kind
of property that with limited resources it would be
best to employ a critical component defense style
system.
Figure 5: Case 4: methodical attack vs. defense-in-depth
To demonstrate this we considered a further case,
where each of the nodes has a similar value for
successful compromise, with the outermost nodes all
valued at 100 with nodes at each successive depth
worth an additional 10 to the attacker. This removes
a single critical point of failure for the defender, which
would spread the damage out across the system
more evenly. Without a single point of failure for the
network, the defender is offered two main strategies,
a system wide defense-in-depth, that protects the
slightly more valuable inner nodes, while providing
basic security across the network, or a perimeter
defense strategy, where the defender attempts to
protect each of the outer nodes as highly as possible.
The results presented in Figure 5 show that by
applying a more even spread of value across the
network, the defensive strategy is consistent with the
strategy presented in case 3 for the defense-in-depth
style defender. Unlike case 3 we are presented with
only a single attacker and defender strategy, where
the attacker is a methodical attacker. The reason for
this is that since the defender has equal value across
their system, there is no incentive to try and defend a
single point, given that any targeted defense strategy
would be met with an attacker strategy that would
obtain better results by ignoring that node. For
this reason it means given a methodical attacker,
the attacker has no incentive to change to a less
effective greedy approach, which dictates that the
same cyclical nature of attack and defense strategies
presented in the results of case 3 do not occur.
While exploring the concept of defense-in-depth, we
identified that this strategy does not make sense
when there is a single focal point to defend and
multiple routes to reach that node. We considered
that if there was a defensive point earlier in the attack
graph, that had the same defensive properties as
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Figure 6: Case 5: defending bottleneck
the single valuable node, then it might be preferable
to defend at that point instead. Thus we considered
that if we could create a bottleneck for the attacker,
then it would be more preferable for the defender to
not protect the vulnerable node directly, but instead
protect the system at a node causing a bottleneck
earlier in the system. The reason for this, is that
while defending at bottleneck, the defender is able
to protect not only the most vulnerable node, but all
nodes after the bottleneck in the graph. The rationale
for this is similar to that of perimeter defense.
To test the idea of defense in bottlenecks, we
have designed an additional Case 5, where all of
the attacks must pass through the node ctHist in
order to reach the PLC node. We modified the
scenario for case 3, by removing three attack paths
(highlighted in dashed lines in Figure 3(a)) from the
attacker.
The results in Figure 6, show that by creating a
bottleneck of attacks at an earlier stage of the attack,
it is better to defend ctHist. Since ctHist is protected,
then ctWs, ctRWs and PLC are all effectively
covered as well, which is better than the alternative
critical component defense scenario, which would
leave ctHist, ctWs and ctRWs uncovered. The
system wide defense presented in case 3a would
also be less efficient in a number of cases, since
spreading the defense would potentially open the
attacker to higher value nodes if the attacker were
to implement a more methodical approach.
From the results, the defender uses c5 to defend
the node, since it covers the vulnerabilities at ctHist.
Much like in cases 2 and 3, the defender chooses c5
as the primary control to upgrade, because it gives
the best opportunities for covering additional nodes
with minimal additional investment of time.
Conceptually we believe that critical component
defense makes sense, but as a special case of the
wider concept of defending bottlenecks. As such,
a system that represents defense in bottlenecks
considers that the defense should be centred around
the set of minimal elements that all attacks must
pass through, and if there are multiple minimal sets
of nodes, then the defense should be applied at the
set of nodes that occur earliest in the collection of
attack paths. It should be noted that this applies
when the value of assets increases with depth of the
attack or with a single level of highly valuable nodes,
such as those in an industrial control system.
7. CONCLUSIONS
This work shows that when a defender has relatively
few valuable assets in a system, the best use of
resources and effort available is to apply the defense
to the most valuable nodes. This kind of defense
is particularly important in a number of ICS, where
there is a single critical point of failure for the
organisation. This strategy does not work effectively
if the system has a wide spread of valuable
targets, since there is no single place to focus
the defensive strategy to protect the system. Under
these circumstances, defense-in-depth is generally
preferable, since a set of controls across all nodes
of the network will reduce the viable attack surface.
The defense-in-depth strategy works most effectively
against volumes of attacks, not sophistication, when
we consider limited resources.
When there is a network that also contains other
valuable assets, the optimal defensive strategy must
consider the kind of attacker the system faces.
Where we consider that critical security controls is
best applied to those scenarios where the attacker
develops sophisticated attack methods and attacks
less frequently. However, when there is a hyper
aggressive attacker that is attempting to attack the
system frequently using relatively low effort attacks,
then a defense-in-depth strategy is preferred.
Additionally, we have also introduced the notion
that a more general form of the critical component
defense strategy is to consider a defensive strategy
that operates at bottlenecks in the system by
considering at a location that provides the minimal
attack surface. It should be noted that not all
defenses in ICS are equal, and defending at certain
nodes, such as the PLC, might not be viable due to
a reduction in performance, such as the battery life
of controllers in the field. In addition to considering
performance metrics for implementing defensive
strategies in a system, further work would be carried
out looking at alternative network structures that
would be capable of testing the idea of defense at
bottlenecks further. Coupled with this we aim to look
at the relative amount of resources that each player
has available to identify if the strategies diversify and
what causes the diversification. We will also consider
assigning a temporal factor to each attack in order to
conduct time-dependent analysis.
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